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The Takeaway

On June 5, 2025, the unanimous United States Supreme Court ruled that members of majority groups who bring Title VII reverse discrimination claims no longer face a higher evidentiary burden than minority claimants to establish their prima facie case of discrimination.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas—joined by Justice Gorsuch—urged lower courts to abandon the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework entirely. (That framework has governed summary judgment proceedings in employment discrimination cases for over 50 years.)

Case Background

In Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, No. 23-1039, 605 U.S. ___ (2025), a heterosexual woman claims her employer, an Ohio state agency, passed her over for promotion and then demoted her so positions could be given to gay candidates with less experience. Plaintiff claims her employer discriminated against her on the basis of her sexual orientation (heterosexual), a violation of Title VII. (Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision prohibits employers from intentionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).)

The federal trial court granted summary judgment to the employer, ruling that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of reverse discrimination. The court analyzed Ames’ claims under McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which established the framework for evaluating disparate-treatment claims based on circumstantial evidence.

At the first step of that framework, plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the employer acted with a discriminatory motive. This first step is not meant to be onerous. A plaintiff may satisfy it simply by presenting evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified but was rejected under circumstances suggesting unlawful discrimination. If plaintiff clears this hurdle, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection. Finally, if the employer provides such a reason, the plaintiff must prove the stated justification was a pretext for intentional discrimination.

The trial court ruled that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination because she did not present evidence of “background circumstances” suggesting her employer was one of those rare employers who discriminated against members of the majority group. This additional evidentiary burden—not faced by minority plaintiffs—became known as the “background circumstances” rule. To satisfy it, plaintiffs often had to present “statistical proof or information about the relevant decisionmaker’s protected traits.”

The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Plaintiff failed to meet her prima facie burden because she didn’t show “background circumstances” to support a suspicion that her employer discriminated against members of a majority group.

The Supreme Court’s Unanimous Decision

On review, the United States Supreme Court reversed. Justice Jackson, writing for the unanimous Court, ruled that the “background circumstances” requirement was inconsistent with Title VII’s text or with the Court’s precedent interpreting Title VII. The Court stressed that Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision focuses on individuals rather than groups. In particular, it makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual, with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Court explained:

By establishing the same protections for every “individual”—without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group—Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.

The Court also explained that the “background circumstances” rule ignored the Court’s strong preference for flexibility in establishing plaintiffs’ prima facie case of discrimination. The Court stressed that these requirements “were never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Rather, facts vary from case to case; consequently, the proof required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination also will vary from case to case.

Accordingly, the Court vacated the lower courts’ judgment and remanded the case to apply the proper prima facie standard without requiring any proof of suspicious “background circumstances.”

Concurring Opinion Questions the McDonnell Douglas Framework

Justice Thomas—joined by Justice Gorsuch—filed a concurring opinion in which he welcomed the Court’s rejection of the “background circumstances” rule. But he also urged lower courts to dispense with the McDonnell Douglas framework altogether. Justice Thomas stated that “the McDonnell Douglas framework was made ‘out of whole cloth,’” and had “no basis in the text of Title VII or any other source of law.”  He further characterized the McDonnell Douglas framework as a judge-made rule that has been confusing for courts to apply and “requires a plaintiff to prove too much at summary judgment.” Specifically, he stated it requires plaintiffs to prove facts by a preponderance of evidence, while the traditional summary judgment standard only requires plaintiffs to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

Accordingly, Justice Thomas urged “litigants and lower courts” to be “free to proceed without the McDonnell Douglas framework.” He continued: “This Court has never required anyone to use it. And, district courts are well equipped to resolve summary judgment motions without it.”

While this was not the Court’s majority opinion, the concurrence of Justices Thomas and Gorsuch is important. It previews what could be in store in employment law, i.e., making the McDonnel Douglas framework—which has governed summary judgment proceedings in employment discrimination cases for over 50 years—obsolete.